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The Intimate Geographies
of Panic Disorder:
Parsing Anxiety through
Psychopharmacological Dissection
by Felicity Callard*
ABSTRACT
The category of panic disorder was signiﬁcantly indebted to early psychopharma-
cological experiments (in the late 1950s and early 1960s) by the psychiatrist Donald
Klein, in collaboration with Max Fink. Klein’s technique of “psychopharmacolog-
ical dissection” underpinned his transformation of clinical accounts of anxiety and
was central in effecting the shift from agoraphobic anxiety (with its spatial imagi-
nary of city squares and streets) to panic. This technique disaggregated the previ-
ously unitary affect of anxiety—as advanced in psychoanalytic accounts—into
two physiological and phenomenological kinds. “Psychopharmacological dissec-
tion” depended on particular modes of clinical observation to assess drug action
and to interpret patient behavior. The “intimate geographies” out of which panic
disorder emerged comprised both the socio-spatial dynamics of observation on
the psychiatric ward and Klein’s use of John Bowlby’s model of separation anxi-
ety—as it played out between the dyad of infant and mother—to interpret his adult
patients’ affectively disordered behavior. This essay, in offering a historical geog-
raphy of mid-twentieth-century anxiety and panic, emphasizes the importance of
socio-spatial setting in understanding how clinical and scientiﬁc experimentation
opens up new ways in which affects can be expressed, shaped, observed, and un-
derstood.
MARY J.’S PANIC
In 1981, in the popular psychology magazine Psychology Today, psychiatrists Paul
Wender and Donald Klein heralded the promise of biological psychiatry by empha-
sizing that revelations about the centrality of biological malfunctions in mental illness
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would show many of the tenets of psychodynamic theory to be “irrelevant or even
misleading.”1 They illuminated their argument with brief case histories. One was
of a twenty-three-year-old agoraphobic woman whom they called “Mary J.” She
was an unmarried buyer for a department store who was suffering from debilitating
panic attacks: “She would suddenly be overcome by dizziness, a pounding heart, and
an inability to catch her breath while walking down the street or riding on public
transportation.”2 Wender and Klein noted that physiologically oriented specialists
had tended to diagnose her as suffering from nerves or a virus and had been unable
to help Mary J. when she stopped using subways and buses in favor of taxis, en-
sconced herself in her parents’ home, and gave up her job. Mary J., feeling increas-
ingly desperate, sought a psychoanalyst. Wender and Klein reported that on the
couch:
she began to suspect that the panics might be related to a love affair. Six weeks before the
attacks started, she had been quite upset: her lover had moved to another city. The analyst
closed in on that possibility with penetrating questions. Had her sexual adjustment been
guilt-free after she had begun the affair? Didn’t her fear of being out on the street reﬂect
her unconscious doubts about her sexual self-control—that is, her fear of identiﬁcation as
a streetwalker? Didn’t her clinging dependence on her family show her fear of adulthood
and her unconscious desire to substitute her father for other men?3
Mary J. spent four years “rework[ing] such baroque structures” while her symptoms
came and went. In the end, she left the analyst disillusioned and turned to behavior
therapy, a newer, shorter, and cheaper form of treatment. Wender and Klein described
how she was given instruction in relaxation exercises and desensitization—exposure
to public places—and how, despite initial progress, the panic attacks returned with a
vengeance. Mary J. and her parents were, by then, reportedly desperate and resigned
1 Paul Wender and Donald Klein, “The Promise of Biological Psychiatry,” Psychol. Today, Febru-
ary 1981, 25–41, on 25.
2 Ibid., 31.
3 Ibid. The reference to “her fear of identiﬁcation as a streetwalker” alludes to psychoanalytic mod-
els of agoraphobia. Freud, in his letter to Wilhelm Fliess of 17 December 1896, wrote, “I actually con-
ﬁrmed a conjecture I had entertained for some time concerning the mechanism of agoraphobia in
women. No doubt you will guess it if you think of ‘public’ women. It is the repression of the intention
to take the ﬁrst man one meets in the street: envy of prostitution and identiﬁcation” (Sigmund Freud
and Wilhelm Fliess, The Complete Letters of Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fliess, 1887–1904, trans.
Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson [Cambridge, Mass., 1985], 217–8). While Freud himself wrote little spe-
ciﬁcally on agoraphobia, the associations he made between agoraphobia and sexual fantasies regard-
ing the street were taken up by the next generation of psychoanalysts; see, e.g., Walter Schmideberg,
“Agoraphobia as a Manifestation of Schizophrenia: The Analysis of a Case,” Psychoanal. Rev. 38
(1951): 342–52. The ﬁgure of a woman who sequesters herself indoors and thereby removes herself
from circulation in the public sphere has appeared a number of times in twentieth-century psychiatric
and psychological writings on phobias and anxiety. In 1964, e.g., A. H. Roberts brought to visibility
the ﬁgure of “the housebound housewife” in a retrospective study of married women in London. See
Roberts, “Housebound Housewives—A Follow-Up Study of a Phobic Anxiety State,” Brit. J. Psy-
chiat. 110 (1964): 191–7; see also subsequent research on this ﬁgure by psychiatrist and behavioral
therapist Tom Kraft (e.g., “Sexual Factors in the Development of the Housebound Housewife Syn-
drome,” J. Sex Res. 6 [1970]: 59–63). Understanding the overdetermined way in which gender, class,
and the articulation of the public and private spheres are—within modernity—bound up with each
other, is, I would argue, central to understanding histories of fear and anxiety—both within and be-
yond the domains of science and medicine.
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to her becoming a long-term invalid. But Wender and Klein reported that only a year
later, she had experienced a profound affective and social transformation: she was
living in the city on her own in an apartment, had returned to her job, and was excited
about possible marriage plans. (Let us notice, here, how effective therapeutics trans-
forms “bad” affect into “good,” such that equanimity and happiness are demonstrated
through a turn to normative forms of sociality [returning to a job, excitedly focusing
on marriage].) What had happened? The psychopharmacologists revealed that Mary
J. had volunteered to join a clinical experiment for the treatment of phobias that in-
volved taking an antidepressant medication. The drug had stopped the panic attacks,
and accompanying psychotherapy had “helped her to control her anticipatory anxiety
and allowed her to resume normal activities.” The symptoms, we are told, did not re-
turn when Mary J. stopped taking the medication six months later.
Wender and Klein’s vignette of Mary J. was in the service of their own strong com-
mitment to the effectiveness of biological psychiatry—and as such demanded a dis-
paragement of other clinical approaches to agoraphobia, particularly that of psycho-
analysis, and a narrative that culminated in the triumphant success of drug therapy.
Their article was published a year after the American Psychiatric Association had
anointed the new category of panic disorder in the third edition of the Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-III )—a category that had been
brought into being in large part through Donald Klein’s psychopharmacological re-
search that stretched back to the late 1950s, and whose triumphant arrival on the stage
of American—and subsequently international—psychiatry was, after a long journey,
undoubtedly ensured by Robert Spitzer (the chair of the DSM-III Task Force) select-
ing Klein to join the Task Force on Nomenclature and Statistics.4
Wender and Klein’s article should be read as a celebration not only of drug treat-
ment as cure but of drug treatment as diagnostic dissection tool. The article not only
celebrated how psychopathological affect might be successfully treated via drugs but
exempliﬁed a more wide-ranging logic, developed in large part by Klein, and assem-
bled from both empirical and conceptual elements, in which the very shape and tim-
bre of that psychopathological affect might be identiﬁed and parsed through drugs.5
In the same year that Wender and Klein mused in print over Mary J.’s panic, Klein, in
a chapter intended for a scientiﬁc readership, celebrated what he considered his an-
alytical and methodological breakthrough, namely, “the power of the experimental
technique of pharmacological dissection whereby one can pierce through the fasci-
nating, confusing web of symptoms and dysfunctions to tease out the major partici-
pant variables by attending to speciﬁc drug effects.”6 It was a bold claim that came to
inaugurate and cement a new approach to the study of anxiety. Klein’s pharmacolog-
ical interventions had, he averred, disinterred panic disorder—a phenomenon, and a
very particular manifestation of pathological affect, that had hitherto remained largely
ignored by dint of erroneous formulations concerning agoraphobia.
4 American Psychiatric Association,Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 3rd ed.
(Washington, D.C., 1980). See Hannah S. Decker, The Making of DSM-III: A Diagnostic Manual’s
Conquest of American Psychiatry (New York, 2013), chaps. 4, 5.
5 Klein was of course operating as part of a much larger collectivity of researchers grappling with
how best to conceptualize and describe drug action. Nonetheless, there was something singular as well
as compelling about how he formulated his model of “psychopharmacological dissection,”which but-
tressed what would become a new nosological entity.
6 Donald F. Klein, “Anxiety Reconceptualized,” in Anxiety: New Research and Changing Concepts,
ed. Donald F. Klein and Judith G. Rabkin (New York, 1981), 235–62, on 242.
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What might dwelling on this particular moment—the disinterring of an emotion by
a clinician and a scientist via his observation and analysis of drug effects—contribute
to our understandings of the long history of models and experiences of fear, anxiety,
and phobias? Otniel Dror and colleagues, in their introduction to this volume, ask
whether “discrete scientiﬁc developments structure the expression, experience, visi-
bility, or nature of emotions?”7 While panic as a phenomenon and a topic of concern
in the history of science and medicine stretches much further back than Klein’s post–
World War II drug experiments, the emergence of panic disorder arguably established
a new way through which manifestations of overwhelming, negative affect—experi-
enced by individuals in particular socio-spatial settings—could be understood, nar-
rated, and, indeed, experienced. If agoraphobia as a term consistently posed the ques-
tion of the agora (Why did it provoke fear? How ought it to be construed?), panic
disorder posed questions about the ontology of the affective phenomenon—panic—
itself. Klein himself argued that drug action allowed the observation of two ontolog-
ically distinct kinds of anxiety (anticipatory anxiety and panic) that had been conﬂated
in earlier models and theorizations of anxiety. As historians of science and of the emo-
tions, we might instead continue to ponder whether the particular socio-spatial arrange-
ment of Klein’s psychiatric wards—one that meshed patients’ physiologies, pharmaco-
logical action, patient and staff behavior, and practices of observation—structured the
very way in which particular affects came to be expressed, shaped, and understood.
I will be particularly attentive, here, to the need to understand how geography ﬁg-
ures both in the production of psychopathological affects and in clinical and scientiﬁc
accounts of those psychopathological affects. The socio-spatial assemblage of epis-
temological, methodological, and observational techniques that underpinned Klein’s
work of psychopharmacological dissection operated signiﬁcantly differently from the
one that, since the 1870s, had at its center a clinician puzzling over how to understand
and interpret the actions as well as the affective distress of a ﬁgure attempting to nav-
igate his way through an urban, public landscape that he could not comfortably in-
habit or traverse.8 The neurologist and psychiatrist Carl Friedrich Otto Westphal, who
originated the term agoraphobia in the early 1870s, for example, opened his seminal es-
say by describing how, “for some years patients have repeatedly approached [him] with
the peculiar complaint that it is not possible for them to walk across open spaces and
through certain streets and that, due to the fear of such paths, they are troubled in their
freedom of movement.”9 Westphal’s task, and subsequently that of many neurologists
and psychoanalysts who saw agoraphobic patients in their consulting rooms and in out-
patient clinics in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, was to respond to
those patients’ phenomenologically rich accounts of their inability to move through
7 Otniel E. Dror, Bettina Hitzer, Anja Laukötter, and Pilar León-Sanz, “An Introduction to History
of Science and the Emotions,” in this volume.
8 Note that I have used “he” here. Part of the complex history of gender in relation to agoraphobia is
addressed in Felicity Callard, “Understanding Agoraphobia: Women, Men, and the Historical Geog-
raphy of Urban Anxiety,” in Exploring Women’s Studies: Looking Forward, Looking Back, ed. Carol
Berkin, Judith Pinch, and Carol Appel (Upper Saddle River, N.J., 2006), 201–17.
9 Carl Friedrich Otto Westphal and Terry J. Knapp, Westphal’s “Die Agoraphobie” with Commen-
tary: The Beginnings of Agoraphobia, trans. Michael T. Schumacher (Lanham, Md., 1988), 59. The
German original is Westphal, “Die Agoraphobie: Eine Neuropathische Erscheinung,” Arch. Psychiat.
Nervenkrankheit. 3 (1871): 138–61. Westphal’s other writing on agoraphobia included “Über Platz-
furcht: Brieﬂiche Mitteilungen,” Arch. Psychiat. Nervenkrankheit. 7 (1877): 377–83; “Nachtrag zu
Dem Aufsatze ‘Über Agoraphobie,’” Arch. Psychiat. Nervenkrankheit. 3 (1872): 219–21.
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open squares and down particular streets. Those narratives bound agoraphobic anxiety
tightly to particular urban locales: Westphal, for example, memorably recounted fea-
tures of the Berlin cityscape (including particular squares, as well as the Charlottenburg
zoo) that precipitated extensive fear in the three agoraphobic individualswhose case his-
tories he enumerated in his 1871 article.10 The logic outlined by Klein emerged from a
different socio-spatial world. It was at some distance both fromWestphal’s symbols and
markers of nineteenth-century urbanicity and from the sedate consulting rooms of neu-
rologists and psychoanalysts; it entailed different dynamics of clinical observation. If,
for Westphal, the ﬁgure, gestures, and affective tenor of “the agoraphobe” provoked
clinical intrigue by dint of his stalled passage across the public spaces of the agora,
Klein’s archetypal, phobic-anxiety ﬁgure emerged within the claustral spaces of a men-
tal hospital. What would come to deﬁne him or her would not be, as in the case of
Westphal’s patients, an uncomfortable relationship to walls, passageways, and public
squares, but panic attacks, helplessness, and the need for a reassuring, parent-likeﬁgure.
Thus while Wender and Klein’s plot regarding Mary J. in Psychology Today com-
menced with the puzzle of her breathlessness on city streets, neither Klein’s own prac-
tices of observation nor his investigatory frameworks were centrally preoccupied with
the textures and socio-spatial speciﬁcities of the urban landscape. How Klein’s logic
came to be articulated and how the framework in which it was housed worked is what
I shall track in this article. If histories of the emotions have provided many nuanced ac-
counts of how temporality is construed and mobilized in different models of particular
affects, there has perhaps been less explicit attention to spatiality.11 This essay is intended,
then, as a contribution to the historical geography of the emotions: I am particularly
interested in howKlein workedwith, and characterized in a particular way, his anxious
patients’ experiences of the inpatient ward, as well as how the diagnosis of panic dis-
order dispensed with an explicit emphasis on the subject’s relationship to space (cf.
agoraphobia).
* * *
Wender and Klein’s vignette of Mary J. represented in schematic form the trajectory
that approaches to agoraphobia, and agoraphobic anxiety, took in the United States in
the second half of the twentieth century. That trajectory moved from the hegemony of
psychoanalytic or psychodynamic approaches, to the markedly different therapies
and etiological arguments of the behaviorists, to the near inescapability of psycho-
pharmacology for the understanding and treatment of anxiety, panic, and phobias.12
As different therapeutic regimens jostled for preeminence, they were accompanied by
different models of phobic anxiety: those models worked with a variety of phenom-
enologies of psychopathological affect, of the kinds of individuals who were most
10 Westphal, “Die Agoraphobie” (cit. n. 9). See also Felicity Callard, “‘The Sensation of Inﬁnite
Vastness’; Or, the Emergence of Agoraphobia in the Late 19th Century,” Environ. & Planning D:
Soc. & Space 24 (2006): 873–89.
11 Though for an account that takes seriously the problems of both temporality and spatiality in pro-
viding a ﬁnely grained history of how the affective “accidents of everyday existence” were “trans-
formed into the objects of psychiatric epidemiology,” see Rhodri Hayward, “Sadness in Camberwell:
Imagining Stress and Constructing History in Postwar Britain,” in Stress, Shock, and Adaptation in
the Twentieth Century, ed. David Cantor and Edmund Ramsden (Rochester, N.Y., 2014), 320–42.
12 Up to the 1950s and 1960s, most clinicians in the United States aligned themselves directly or
indirectly either with the work of Freud or with the psychobiological or psychosocial approaches
of those such as Adolph Meyer and William Menninger. The late 1950s was a period of great trans-
formation in the American psychiatric establishment. Psychoanalysis was facing attacks from several
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susceptible to being gripped by such affect, of narratives about how such affect would
manifest on and through the body, and of what precipitated and maintained those
manifestations of affect. Those models were subtended by both implicit and explicit
claims about the kind of clinical expert, and the kind of observational practices in
which he or she was proﬁcient, that were appropriate to identify and then to intervene
upon that affect.
I shall be interested in analyzing speciﬁcally how Donald Klein’s early psycho-
pharmacological research—conducted in collaboration with the psychiatrist and clin-
ical researcher Max Fink—helped to transform the techniques and conceptual appa-
ratus for observing, identifying, and parsing psychopathological manifestations of
anxiety.13 Surprisingly, there has been relatively little ﬁne-grained historical work that
has focused speciﬁcally on the imbrication of observational and epistemological frame-
works in mid-twentieth-century psychiatry, and their centrality in grounding not only
particular diagnostic entities and/or symptoms but particular conceptualizations of
psychopathological affect.14 This article intends to make a contribution to that body
of literature.
My argument relies on analyses of published documentation. It therefore reckons
with, as well as potentially further embeds, the rhetorical power of Klein’s and Fink’s
written arguments—whether in journal articles reporting their empirical ﬁndings or in
retrospective narrative accounts of the discovery of psychopharmacological dissec-
tion. I am aware of the gap that undoubtedly exists between those tidied, published
accounts, and the actual heterogeneous practices of observation that would have taken
place in the clinical spaces that acted as the crucible for the development of Klein and
Fink’s conceptual architecture. Nonetheless, given the centrality of the scalpellic logic
of psychopharmacological dissection to the emergence of panic disorder, and the sur-
prising dearth of theoretico-historical elaborations of that logic in the history of psy-
chiatry, close consideration of the workings of those published texts is, I argue, jus-
tiﬁed.15
13 Other historical and sociological investigations of agoraphobia and anxiety include Anthony
Vidler, Warped Space: Art, Architecture, and Anxiety in Modern Culture (Cambridge, Mass., 2000);
Paul Carter, Repressed Spaces: The Poetics of Agoraphobia (London, 2002); Jackie Orr, Panic Dia-
ries: A Genealogy of Panic Disorder (Durham, N.C., 2006); Callard, “‘The Sensation of Inﬁnite Vast-
ness’” (cit. n. 10); KathrynMilun,Pathologies ofModern Space: Empty Space, Urban Anxiety, and the
Recovery of the Public Self (New York, 2007); Shelley Zipora Reuter, Narrating Social Order: Ago-
raphobia and the Politics of Classiﬁcation (Toronto, 2007).
14 Let me be clear. There are of course historical, anthropological, and sociological studies that have
attended carefully to psychiatric case records to demonstrate how diagnostic categories were made
(e.g., Jonathan Metzl, The Protest Psychosis: How Schizophrenia Became a Black Disease [Boston,
2009]). However, relatively few have analyzed how particular epistemological frameworks were
bound up with certain practices of observation and their eliciting and interpretation of particular data.
One example that focuses on late nineteenth-century psychiatric nosology is KathleenM. Brian, “‘Oc-
casionally Heard to Be Answering Voices’: Aural Culture and the Ritual of Psychiatric Audition,
1877–1911,” Hist. Psychiat. 23 (2012): 305–17.
15 Klein’s early experiments with Max Fink are discussed and analyzed in David Healy, The Anti-
depressant Era (Cambridge, Mass., 1997), 191–3; Orr, Panic Diaries (cit. n. 13), 170–2, 205–9. Nei-
quarters: behaviorists accused psychoanalysts of unscientiﬁc methods and proposed very different
models of fear and anxiety that derived from the early twentieth-century classical conditioning exper-
iments of researchers such as Ivan Pavlov. Prominent among them was Joseph Wolpe, who developed
methods of behavioral desensitization to phobic objects. See Wolpe, Psychotherapy by Reciprocal In-
hibition (Stanford, Calif., 1958).
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HOW DO THE DRUGS ACT?
The synthesis of chlorpromazine in 1951, and its arrival on the psychiatric scene in
France in 1952, was a key moment in the development of psychopharmacology. It
was termed a “major tranquilizer,” not least because of its striking effects on the be-
havior of some psychotic patients. These effects raised intriguing problems for psy-
chiatrists and pharmacological researchers,16 for it was becoming clear to them that
they possessed few methods to assess not only the effectiveness of drug therapies but
also the effects of other treatments (such as lobotomy and electroconvulsive therapy)
already within the psychiatric therapeutic armamentarium. In the United States, unan-
swered methodological, epistemological, and ontological questions about drugs and
drug action increasingly preoccupied the Committee on Psychiatry of the National
Academy of Sciences–National Research Council, the National Institute of Mental
Health (NIMH), and the Committee on Research of the American Psychiatric Asso-
ciation. In 1956, the “Conference on the Evaluation of Pharmacotherapy inMental Ill-
ness” was organized by the psychiatrist Jonathan Cole17 and the neurophysiologist
Ralph Gerard in order to break new ground. The conference had grown out of conver-
sations within and across those committees and organizations and was intended to ad-
dress the nub of the problem, namely: “Do the drugs act? How do the drugs act? What
if the drugs act?” The domain of affect would be central to any kind of answer to the
ﬁrst question, since any determination regarding therapeutic beneﬁt for psychiatric
disorders would undoubtedly consider potential affective as well as cognitive transfor-
mations in the bodies of those ingesting those drugs.
At the time of that conference, the protocols and frameworks surrounding the or-
ganization and practice of clinical evaluation in general, and of clinical trials in par-
16 David Healy provides a comprehensive overview of the arrival of psychopharmacology, includ-
ing the momentous synthesis of chlorpromazine. Healy, The Creation of Psychopharmacology (Cam-
bridge, Mass., 2002); see also Healy, The Antidepressant Era (cit. n. 15). Viola Balz and Volker Hess
provide a detailed analysis of the challenges raised by chlorpromazine in Germany (Balz and Hess,
“Psychopathology and Psychopharmacology: Standardisation from the Bottom Up, Using the Exam-
ple of Neuroleptics,” in Harmonizing Drugs: Standards in 20th-Century Pharmaceutical History, ed.
Christian Bonah, Christophe Masutti, Anne Rasmussen, and Jonathan Simon [Paris, 2009]). See also
Thomas A. Ban, “Fifty Years Chlorpromazine: A Historical Perspective,” Neuropsychiat. Dis. Treat. 3
(2007): 495–500; Andrew C. Leon, “Evolution of Psychopharmacology Trial Design and Analysis:
Six Decades in the Making,” J. Clin. Psychiat. 72 (2011): 331–40.
17 On Cole’s central role in early psychopharmacological research in the United States, see Martin M.
Katz, “Jonathan O. Cole,” Neuropsychopharmacology 35 (2010): 2647; Nina R. Schooler, “Jonathan O.
Cole, MD (1925–2009): Innovator in Clinical Psychopharmacology and of the ECDEU/NCDEU Tradi-
tion,” J. Clin. Psychiat. 72 (2011): 286–7. See also Jonathan O. Cole and David Healy, “Jonathan Cole:
The Evaluation of Psychotropic Drugs,” in The Psychopharmacologists: Interviews by Dr. David Healy,
by David Healy, 3 vols. (London, 1996), 1:239–63.
ther systematically addresses the logic underlying the observational practices that underpin Klein’s
“psychopharmacological dissection.” I am sympathetic to Viola Balz’s arguments vis-à-vis the dan-
gers of relying on published material by and interviews with psychiatrists and other scientiﬁc re-
searchers (Balz, “Terra Incognita: An Historiographic Approach to the First Chlorpromazine Trials
Using Patient Records of the Psychiatric University Clinic in Heidelberg,” Hist. Psychiat. 22
(2011): 182–200). As she rightly notes, this ends up silencing the patient’s voice and rendering invis-
ible the complex relation between clinician and patient around which the act and action of drug taking
took place. My longer-term aim is to work with the patient records from the Hillside Hospital, to
which I have not yet been able to gain access. Here, I focus on the logics mobilized by psychiatric
clinicians in their published texts, logics in which the patient’s voice is, for multiple reasons (some
of which will become clearer later in this article), attenuated if not obliterated. Since the outcome
of Klein’s logic was wide-ranging and inﬂuential, I believe it is worth analyzing.
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ticular, were still very much in ﬂux. Gerard, for example, in outlining to the audience
the scope of the problems that the ﬁeld of drug testing in human subjects was facing,
emphasized how much work there was still to be done in determining “the selection
of the experimental and of the control populations, the testing conditions, the criteria
for evaluating change, the follow-up procedures, the quantitative judgments and the
properties of reporting results.”18 How, he asked, should the timing and dose of the
drug be determined? Where should the drug be administered? (In order to emphasize
the importance of context for determining how substance and soma interact, Gerard
quipped that “alcohol acts different [sic] in the presence of one’s boss or one’s blond.”)19
How do changes in the ward situation during the experiment affect drug action? Should
one select control populations, and if so, on what grounds does one designate them as
controls? From whom or from what should one gather and/or elicit information about
any changes produced by the drug?Gerard’s questions pointed to the complexwebs that
connected the drug and the patient’s body to the various worlds in which she lived and
within which the potential action of the drug might be observed and rendered visible.
What, exactly, should be held stable for change to be both discerned and measured?
How might the emergence or attenuation of particular affects in and through patients’
bodies be one conduit through which a claim for the effectiveness of a drug’s action
might be lodged? And what kinds of practices, housed within which kinds of bodies
and drawing on which kinds of observational skills, would be best placed to discern
and measure those changes?
Let us zero in on Cole’s deliberations over which aspects of the patient needed to
be monitored for signs of change, and which technologies and practices of observa-
tion needed to be mobilized in order to do so. Cole grappled with the fact that, at that
moment, there was neither general agreement nor any uniﬁed codes of practice either
in relation to describing, or indeed naming, changes in psychopathological behavior
or in relation to identifying speciﬁc effects that the new drugs helped to bring about. It
was on this muddled and muddied terrain—a terrain that featured the patient’s body,
the psychopharmacological substance, the clinical scientist, other clinical care staff,
and the wards in which they were emplaced—that Donald Klein, a few years later,
would come to excavate what he argued were ontologically heterogeneous manifes-
tations of anxiety. The crispness of Klein’s empirical and conceptual work was un-
derpinned by what he maintained was the near-surgical precision of one particular
drug as it functioned as a psychopharmacological dissection tool. As we recognize
the boldness of Klein’s maneuver, we might do well simultaneously to keep in view
the dense and heterogeneous landscape—material, methodological, and epistemolog-
ical—with which such a maneuver had both to reckon and, ultimately, to dispense.
Cole, in his conference presentation, covered a gamut of tools and techniques that
might be used—starting with clinical rating scales, and moving through interview
content analysis (of use, he suggested, in ﬁne-grained analyses of progress in psycho-
therapy, or for following the effects of other therapies by dint of frequent psychother-
18 Ralph W. Gerard, “Orientation: Analysis of Program,” in Psychopharmacology: Problems in
Evaluation: Proceedings of a Conference on The Evaluation of Pharmacotherapy in Mental Illness
Sponsored by the National Institute of Mental Health, the National Academy of Sciences–National
Research Council, and the American Psychiatric Association, Washington, D.C., September 18–22,
1956, ed. Jonathan O. Cole and Ralph W. Gerard (Washington, D.C., 1959), 9–19, on 13.
19 Ibid., 15.
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apeutic interviews), psychological tests (which included the Rorschach, as well as
personality tests used in clinical psychology), and physiological evaluation (such
as estimating autonomic “reactivity” by injecting small doses of sympathetic or para-
sympathetic drugs to predict response to somatic therapy).20 Cole was acutely aware
of the problems posed by the contemporaneous scientiﬁc push to increase the scale of
psychopharmacological experimentation and analysis. For example, he noted that in
a study taking place in a large state hospital, a six-item rating scale may be superior to
a ﬁfty-item scale and concluded—in a sentence that accurately presaged the incipient
arrival of many short psychiatric rating scales in psychiatry—that “brief rating scales
for judgments of the patient’s psychopathology, to be ﬁlled out both by the admitting
physician and by the nurses and aides, could be of considerable help in delimiting bet-
ter the types of patients helped and in providing easily usable data amplifying the as-
signed diagnosis.”21 The conference as a whole was, indeed, ﬁlled with scientists’ and
clinicians’ ambitions to push toward larger scales of analysis and evaluation, and with
recognition of their need for better technologies to track and capture change across
large vistas of clinical experimentation.
We see, then, how central geography was to the challenge of assessing affective
and cognitive change. I use the term “geography” to connote both the physical spaces
in which and through which drug action might be adjudicated and measured and the
various socio-spatial imaginaries mobilized by clinical researchers. Should the eval-
uative terrain encompass the microgeographies of conversations between patient and
psychoanalyst, or the slightly broader circuit between clinician, patient, and the tech-
nological device of a printed rating scale? Or should the focus rather be on the dy-
namic psychosociological topologies of spatial interactions and atmospheres within
the ward, or on tracing out a temporally dislocated geography in which social workers
are sent on unexpected visits to discharged patients, beyond the reaches of the hos-
pital and of the locus of the treatment itself ?22 Even if clarity could be acquired about
the appropriate socio-spatial context in which to evaluate psychopharmacological ac-
tion, there remained unresolved questions about the accuracy of the behavioral and
affectively freighted material that would be acquired. For example, some psychoan-
alytically oriented researchers worried that assessing therapeutic change by analyzing
interview content would result in ﬁxating too much on conscious, verbal communi-
cation and occlude analysis of unconscious motivations and nonverbal modes of
communication.23
20 Jonathan O. Cole, “The Evaluation of the Effectiveness of Treatment in Psychiatry,” in Cole and
Gerard, Psychopharmacology (cit. n. 18), 92–107.
21 Ibid., 104; emphasis added. A number of rating scales were developed in the late 1950s and early
1960s; those that became particularly inﬂuential in psychiatry include Max E. Hamilton, “The Assess-
ment of Anxiety States by Rating,” Brit. J. Med. Psychol. 32 (1959): 50–5; Hamilton, “A Rating Scale
for Depression,” J. Neurol. Neurosurg. Psychiat. 23 (1960): 56–62; A. T. Beck et al., “An Inventory
for Measuring Depression,” Arch. Gen. Psychiat. 4 (1961): 561–71; John E. Overall and Donald R.
Gorham, “The Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale,” Psychol. Rep. 10 (1962): 799–812. See also Michael
Worboys, “The Hamilton Rating Scale for Depression: The Making of a ‘Gold Standard’ and the Un-
making of a Chronic Illness, 1960–1980,” Chronic Illness 9 (2013): 202–19.
22 Such evaluative methods were used by the psychiatrist Maxwell Jones, pioneer of the concept
of the therapeutic community. Jones, The Therapeutic Community: A New Treatment Method in Psy-
chiatry (New York, 1953).
23 See Cole, “Evaluation” (cit. n. 20), 100.
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Perhaps it was not surprising, then, that Cole ﬁnished his address by noting that, in
spite of the clinical and scientiﬁc evaluative innovations offered by various technol-
ogies, by the use of diverse socio-spatial settings, and by the push toward assessing
larger numbers of patients across multiple sites, “The detailed study of the response to
treatment of the individual patient under the experienced observer will still, no doubt,
provide leads to be tested on a larger group of patients.”24 That statement appears to
be a call to order grounded on straightforwardness and simplicity: Find one trained
observer who can focus on the individual patient! And, indeed, as we shall see, much
of the potency of Donald Klein’s early scientiﬁc innovations arose precisely from the
act of a small number of experienced observers studying the response to treatment of
a small number of patients. There is no doubt that Klein’s achievement in installing
panic disorder as a new nosological entity was signiﬁcantly dependent on small-scale,
intimate geographies and was not born from the large, multisite experiments that were
fantasized about at the 1956 drug evaluation conference. But we should not be hood-
winked by the apparent simplicity of Cole’s injunction. What constitutes, in practice,
the actions and interpretations of any one “experienced observer” in psychiatric re-
search is anything but straightforward.25
CREATIVE EXPERIMENTATION IN HILLSIDE HOSPITAL
Historians of US psychiatry have spent much analytical and empirical energy detail-
ing the shift from psychodynamic models (prominent, e.g., in the second edition of
the DSM ) to the classiﬁcatory logics of DSM-III.26 Central to that shift toward new
classiﬁcatory logics was the proliferation in the 1960s and 1970s of psychiatric rating
scales in relation to both symptoms and diagnoses. This emphasis on ratings in the
service of standardization, in particular as regards the imperative to ensure reliability
in relation to psychiatric diagnoses, has had consequences beyond that of directing
our focal gaze toward 1980, the watershed year in which DSM-III was published.
One consequence comprises the tight bonds that have been drawn between the emer-
gence of psychopharmacology, the development of robust clinical protocols, and the
overall push toward standardization. This narrative of methodological transformation
has made it more difﬁcult, perhaps, to keep in focus some of the most imaginative and
inﬂuential early psychopharmacological studies, which departed signiﬁcantly from
the driving logic of rating scales with their impetus toward a standardization of symp-
tomatology and an elaboration of target symptoms.27 My focus here will be on the
24 Ibid., 104.
25 As Lorraine Daston and Elizabeth Lunbeck have made clear, “Observation is a highly contrived
and disciplined form of experience that requires training of the body and mind, material props, tech-
niques of description and visualization, networks of communication and transmission, canons of ev-
idence, and specialized forms of reasoning.” See Daston and Lunbeck, “Observation Observed,” in
Histories of Scientiﬁc Observation, ed. Daston and Lunbeck (Chicago, 2011), 1–9, on 3. In my essay,
I want to draw attention to the authority accruing to a certain kind of clinical observation, and to its
importance in foregrounding a particular psychopathological affect. For other examinations of the
complex relationship between the clinical and/or scientiﬁc observer and that which she observes,
see Lunbeck, “Empathy as a Psychoanalytic Mode of Observation: Between Sentiment and Science,”
and Otniel Dror, “Seeing the Blush: Feeling Emotions,” both in Daston and Lunbeck, Histories, 255–
75, 326–48; Tiffany Watt Smith, On Flinching: Theatricality and Scientiﬁc Looking from Darwin to
Shell-Shock (Oxford, 2014).
26 Decker, The Making of DSM-III (cit. n. 4).
27 Two important exceptions include scholarship by David Healy and by Viola Balz and colleagues
(who emphasize the importance in early German psychopharmacology of long-term clinical observa-
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creative experimentation that entangled drugs, bodies, minds, and affects in a far-
from-standardized early set of experiments that took place in one small psychiatric
hospital in the United States in the late 1950s. I am locating our analytic gaze, in other
words, on a historical-geographical site that is signiﬁcantly different from the perhaps
more settled, and perhaps epistemologically less lively, clinical and research land-
scape that would come to be installed via the logics of the psychiatric randomized
controlled trial and, subsequently, the framework of DSM-III.
What kinds of scientiﬁc and clinical observation of research patients were sanc-
tioned in Klein and Fink’s early psychopharmacological experiments, and how did
they help consolidate new ontologies of psychopathological anxiety, as well as new
kinds of interpretations of anxious bodies?28 As I emphasized at the start of this article,
the affect of anxiety was not front and center in the investigators’ ﬁeld of vision as
these experiments commenced. The clinical researchers did not start with a series
of questions about how to understand the phenomenology of agoraphobic anxiety;
rather, the hinge that shifted the analytical plane and that served to open up the prob-
lematic of anxiety was the introduction of the psychopharmacological substances
themselves.
Hillside Hospital, where those experiments took place, is located in Glen Oaks, Long
Island, New York.29 In 1954, the hospital established research programs “devoted to
an understanding of the mode of action of the psychiatric therapies of the hospital.”30
Hillside Hospital was a Jewish hospital—which, in that period, meant being located
beyond the orbit and the sphere of inﬂuence of the large, university-afﬁliated research
hospitals—and was, in the late 1950s, largely focused around psychoanalytic thera-
pies. Max Fink, who headed the experimental psychiatry research program, and his
colleague Donald Klein (who at that time was a research associate and a mental
health career investigator funded through NIMH) were developing new methodolo-
gies through which to investigate the mode of action of drug therapies. And if they
were preoccupied with exactly the problems enumerated in the 1956 conference on
the evaluation of pharmacotherapy—“Do the drugs act? How do the drugs act? What
if the drugs act?”—they were particularly interested in ﬁguring out the answer to a
fourth question: In relation to which kinds of patients?
28 See Deborah Blythe Doroshow on Fink’s therapeutic practices as regards insulin coma therapy.
Doroshow, “Performing a Cure for Schizophrenia: Insulin Coma Therapy on theWards,” J. Hist. Med.
Allied Sci. 62 (2007): 213–43.
29 “Hillside Hospital is a 196-bed, open ward, voluntary psychiatric facility for the treatment of pa-
tients with early and acute mental disorders whose stay is independent of their ability to pay. All pa-
tients are seen in individual psychotherapy, with the expectation that psychotherapy should be given a
trial prior to other measures. Somatic therapies are employed by joint decision of the resident therapist
and supervising psychiatrist, with the management of medication restricted to the research staff ”;
Donald F. Klein and Max Fink, “Psychiatric Reaction Patterns to Imipramine,” Am J. Psychiat. 119
(1962): 432–8, on 432. See also Irving J. Sands, “The First Twenty-Five Years of Hillside Hospital:
AVoluntary Psychiatric Hospital,” J. Hillside Hospital 2 (1953): 199–206; Robert L. Kahn, Max Pol-
lack, and Max Fink, “Social Factors in the Selection of Therapy,” J. Hillside Hospital 6 (1957): 216–
28.
30 Max Fink, “Experimental Psychiatric Research at Hillside: Review and Prospect,” J. Hillside
Hospital 10 (1961): 159–69.
tion and psychopathological theory, as opposed to a focus on standardized rating scales and target
symptoms). Healy, The Antidepressant Era (cit. n. 15); Healy, Creation (cit. n. 16); Balz, “Terra In-
cognita” (cit. n. 15); Balz and Hess, “Psychopathology” (cit. n. 16); Viola Balz and Matthias Hoheisel,
“East-Side Story: The Standardisation of Psychotropic Drugs at the Charité Psychiatric Clinic, 1955–
1970,” Stud. Hist. Phil. Biol. Biomed. Sci. 42 (2011): 453–66.
THE INTIMATE GEOGRAPHIES OF PANIC DISORDER 213
They therefore created a laboratory within the psychiatric hospital and established
a system through which to control the prescription of psychotropic drugs throughout
the hospital.31 They put procedures in place: all prescriptions were dispensed by a
psychiatrist—Klein—within the Department of Experimental Psychiatry, who re-
sponded to a request made by the therapist of a particular patient and interviewed
the patient prior to dispensing the drug. During the period of drug therapy, the pa-
tient’s response was assessed weekly, and in a variety of ways, from the perspective
of various individuals—by the patients themselves, by ward staff, by the patient’s
therapist, and by the therapist’s supervisor. (We shall return shortly to how those per-
spectives were weighted on the basis of authority and clinical importance.) The dos-
age and the type of medication could be altered. From October 1958 to October 1959,
Klein and Fink treated 120 patients with chlorpromazine, promazine, or prochlor-
perazine (all phenothiazines) and eighty-seven patients with imipramine. Imipramine
was, at that point, a new drug that had emerged through the Swiss psychiatrist Roland
Kuhn experimentally examining the effects of a Geigy compound. (This compound
was similar in structure to that of chlorpromazine; it did not appear to have much ef-
fect on psychotic symptoms but did appear to reduce the depression of patients diag-
nosed with schizophrenia. Imipramine is now commonly described as the ﬁrst tricy-
clic antidepressant.)32 In an associated study, a total of 215 patients received only
imipramine between October 1959 and July 1961; Klein and Fink published two
seminal papers relating to those two studies.33 Subsequently, after the therapeutic suc-
cess of those early, open experiments, a randomized placebo trial was carried out.34 In
assessing drug action, Klein and Fink paid attention to what they designated “changes
in mental status and hospital adjustment,” “progress in psychotherapy,” and “utiliza-
tion of hospital facilities.” Crucially, the patient’s diagnosis was not at stake in the
decision over which drug to prescribe, and Klein and Fink also argued that current
psychodynamic formulations were of no help in predicting course of illness or treat-
ment. They therefore jettisoned both existing diagnostic classiﬁcations and all psy-
chodynamic formulations; instead, they aimed to set aside commonly used frame-
works of adjudication the better to attend to the bodies and actions of those patients
who had received drugs from the prescribing physician. “Present techniques of evalu-
ating therapies by global improvement scores, imprecise diagnostic classiﬁcation, and
31 Psychoanalysts at that time were not keen to prescribe drugs, seeing them as disruptive of the
transferential relationship between analyst and patient. In many hospitals, one doctor would be des-
ignated the “druggist”: he or she would prescribe drugs, leaving the remaining psychiatrists free to
conduct psychotherapy/psychoanalysis (see Healy, Antidepressant Era [cit. n. 15], 191). My account
of Klein and Fink’s experiments is greatly indebted to their own two journal publications document-
ing those early studies, as well as Klein’s retrospective reﬂections on these experiments. See Donald F.
Klein andMax Fink, “Behavioral Reaction Patterns with Phenothiazine,” Arch. Gen. Psychiat. 7 (1962):
449–59; Klein and Fink, “Psychiatric Reaction Patterns” (cit. n. 29); Klein, “Anxiety Reconceptualized”
(cit. n. 6); Donald Klein and David Healy, “Donald Klein: Reaction Patterns to Psychotropic Drugs and
the Discovery of Panic Disorder,” in Healy, The Psychopharmacologists (cit. n. 17), 1:329–52.
32 Walter A. Brown and Maria Rosdolsky, “The Clinical Discovery of Imipramine,” Amer. J. Psy-
chiat. 172 (2015): 426–9.
33 Klein and Fink, “Psychiatric Reaction Patterns” (cit. n. 29); Klein and Fink, “Behavioral Reaction
Patterns” (cit. n. 31).
34 My focus here is purely on the early experiments that operated outside of the logic of a controlled,
placebo trial. The later ﬁxed dosage, double-blind study was reported in Donald F. Klein, “Importance
of Psychiatric Diagnosis in Prediction of Clinical Drug Effects,” Arch. Gen. Psychiat. 16 (1967): 118–
26.
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target symptoms abstracted from their context were,” they emphasized, “felt to be
methodologically inadequate.”35 Klein and Fink documented eight distinct patterns
of “behavior change” for those treated with the phenothiazines and seven for those
treated with imipramine. Their underlying claim was that the interaction of particular
patients with particular drugs allowed the identiﬁcation of distinct “reaction patterns.”
The “descriptive behavioral typology” that allowed those reaction patterns to become
visible was produced through three research psychiatrists reviewing the patients’ de-
tailed records and coming to a consensus “concerning the patient’s behavioral reaction
during the medication period.”36
For our purposes, what is crucial is the pattern that Klein and Fink identiﬁed as
relating to “episodic anxiety”: it was this pattern that would, in time, become renamed
and reimagined as “panic disorder.”37 Those patients grouped under episodic anxiety
were variously characterized, before treatment, as experiencing “episodes of felt anx-
iety and helplessness, associated with fearful clinging and urgent demands for aid,”38
or as experiencing “the sudden onset of inexplicable ‘panic’ attacks, accompanied by
rapid breathing, palpitations, weakness, and a feeling of impending death.”39 Notably,
they deﬁned the “hallmark” of those patients’ condition as “expectant fear of lack of
support when overwhelmed” (though they also noted that “their condition was often
referred to as agoraphobia”).40 With phenothiazine (“major tranquilizer”) treatment,
these patients’ “episodic anxiety” was unaffected: while the tension they experienced
might sometimes be reduced, “depressive complaints were not alleviated and phobic
limitations on activity continued.”41With imipramine, in notable contrast, “the ‘panic’
attacks ceased, . . . [although] the patients were reluctant to change their phobic behav-
ior pattern and required much persuasion, direction and support.”42 The psychiatrists
noted, furthermore, in those patients showing a positive reaction to imipramine treat-
ment, “a surprising rise in aggressive self-assertion and rejection in domination”; re-
sponse to imipramine showed “no special relationship to age or sex.”43
Episodic anxiety patients provoked particular analytic attention from Klein and
Fink “because of the apparently paradoxical nature of their drug response”: while
the patients were clearly very anxious, the phenothiazines—tranquilizers—strangely
had no effect, either on the particular quality of their anxiety or on their “phobic lim-
itations.” (These limitations included the behaviors of some patients who, “between
episodes [of anxiety] . . . manipulated the staff to enable them to remain within the
35 Klein and Fink, “Psychiatric Reaction Patterns” (cit. n. 29), 432.
36 Klein and Fink, “Behavioral Reaction Patterns” (cit. n. 31), 449.
37 The term “panic disorder” did not emerge until the late 1970s; throughout the 1960s, Klein—
while referring to attacks of panic—continued to use anxiety as the dominant nosological term.
For example, in 1967, he referred to the “phobic-anxiety reaction”; Klein, “Importance of Psychiatric
Diagnosis” (cit. n. 34), 121. In Klein’s book on diagnosis, coauthored by John M. Davis and pub-
lished in the late 1960s, he and Davis deﬁned “panic anxiety” as “the state of being suddenly over-
whelmed by fearful sensations,” which is “accompanied by massive autonomic responses, both sym-
pathetic and parasympathetic.” See Klein and Davis, Diagnosis and Drug Treatment of Psychiatric
Disorders (Baltimore, 1969), 325.
38 Klein and Fink, “Behavioral Reaction Patterns” (cit. n. 31), 456.
39 Klein and Fink, “Psychiatric Reaction Patterns” (cit. n. 29), 435.
40 Ibid.
41 Klein and Fink, “Behavioral Reaction Patterns” (cit. n. 31), 456.
42 Klein and Fink, “Psychiatric Reaction Patterns” (cit. n. 29), 436.
43 Ibid.
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phobically deﬁned safe areas or to have constant attendance by aides.”)44 Why were
phenothiazines not effective for those patients, whereas imipramine was effective? If
Klein and Fink had dramatically succeeded in rendering visible distinctive reaction
patterns among the patients in their cohort, they still needed to explain why imipra-
mine helped patients with episodic anxiety.
PANIC DISORDER’S ORIGIN STORY
Klein offered a number of retrospective reﬂections on his early experiments at Hill-
side Hospital, in which he set out, in characteristically vigorous prose, his explana-
tion for the action of imipramine.45 Notably, Klein chose to exemplify the stakes
of his account by turning to clinical observations that were made regarding one par-
ticularmale patient. Clinical descriptions of this patient’s suffering and treatmentmight,
indeed, be classiﬁed as the origin story of the nosological category of panic disorder.46
Through considering this origin tale in some detail, we will be able to discern the rela-
tion thatwas traced between the practice of observation and the phenomenon thatwas its
object—the relation that underpinned Klein’s practice of psychopharmacological dis-
section.
The story begins in Hillside Hospital with the patient’s doctor calling Klein. The
doctor described his patient as schizophrenic and told Klein that treatment with the
phenothiazine chlorpromazine had made the patient worse. Klein was not convinced
that the patient was schizophrenic: he was neither delusional nor hallucinating and
manifested no thought disorder or restriction of affect. He was, however, Klein em-
phasized, “hideously anxious, extremely dependent, extremely demanding.”47 Klein
described this experimental and clinical situation as one that allowed him to bring
into the same terrain a “patient we didn’t know what to do with” and “a drug [imip-
ramine] . . . we were unsure what it did.”He “mixed them together” through a process
that he characterized as “pure empiricism.”48 After a couple of weeks of imipramine
treatment, there appeared to be no change in the patient’s symptoms and the patient
was complaining bitterly of his continuing anguish. After the third or fourth week,
however, the nurses in the wards felt that something had altered, though they were
unable to put their ﬁnger on quite what that was; neither the patient nor his therapist
nor the therapist’s supervisor believed there to be any change. Finally, one nurse—
whom Klein described a number of times as a “good observer”—pointed out that the
patient was no longer running to the nurses every few hours wanting help and feeling
as though he were dying.49 After several more weeks, Klein averred that those improve-
44 Donald F. Klein, “Delineation of Two Drug-Responsive Anxiety Syndromes,” Psychopharma-
cologia 5 (1964): 397, 398.
45 Klein’s theoretical architecture would become more elaborate over time, though he has not de-
parted from the basic logic of his early accounts.
46 The story of this “originary” patient is elaborated in Klein, “Anxiety Reconceptualized” (cit. n. 6);
Klein and Healy, “Donald Klein” (cit. n. 31), 311. Klein also spoke at some length about this patient in
his interview with me (Donald Klein, interview by Felicity Callard, digital recording, The Hamptons,
New York, 28–30 July 2011). In “Anxiety Reconceptualized,” the one patient becomes a group of
patients, although the structure of the narrative is the same. I refer to a singular patient.
47 Klein and Healy, “Donald Klein” (cit. n. 31), 331.
48 Ibid.
49 Klein, in his interview with me, said “one of [the ward staff ] who’s a good observer said, ‘You
know, this guy’s been coming to the nursing station four times a day for the past nine months saying
he’s dying’” (Klein, interview by Callard [cit. n. 46]).
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ments could not be discounted—even though the patient’s own explanation for his be-
havior was that he had ﬁnally realized the nurses could do nothing for him and that he
was therefore no longer running to them. Indeed, the good doctor is required to point out
changed behavior to the unknowing patient: according to Klein’s account, the patient
was “stunned” since “he had no idea he had changed his behavior.”50
Klein described how he and his colleagues were initially puzzled by the strange
turn of events. Was the patient primarily depressed rather than anxious or phobic,
such that the imipramine, with its antidepressant qualities, was lifting his depression
and simultaneously alleviating his anxiety symptoms?Klein noted, however, that “most
of the patients [within the episodic anxiety group] neither looked nor acted depressed,”
and “thoughts of suicide, guilt, and depressive ideas of reference were conspicuously
absent.”51
What Klein characterized as a scene of “pure empiricism” became a scene that—
through the interlocking actions of a drug whose action was uncertain and of observ-
ers who were not sure what they might be on the lookout for—unfurled two distinct
ontologies of psychopathological anxiety. Klein argued that observations of this origi-
nary patient allowed him to parse anxiety into two kinds, in contradistinction to the
prevailing psychoanalytic model of anxiety.52 Klein installed “a physiological discon-
tinuity” between what he came to term “paroxysmal anxiety” (which was manifested,
e.g., when the patient ran to the nurses) and “chronic anxiety” (fromwhich the patients
suffered most of the time).53 He interpreted imipramine as acting on the paroxysmal
anxiety but having no effect on the chronic anxiety because that anxiety was of a dif-
ferent order. Now that Klein had divided anxiety into two phenomenological and
physiological kinds, he was able—in subsequent research and publications—to clar-
ify the link between them. The various phobias that beset patients like the “originary”
patient, as well as those patients’ chronic and anticipatory anxiety, were all directed
toward the avoidance of panic attacks:
In other words, what they feared was having a panic attack, particularly having one while
in a helpless situation. We began to understand why such patients would not drive over a
bridge or into a tunnel. The simple answer, without resort to psychoanalytic symbolism,
was that they realized that once they had committed themselves to a bridge or a tunnel
there would be no way to stop, so that if a panic attack occurred, they would be completely
helpless and isolated.54
Klein emphasized that patients’ intense attacks of anxiety came ﬁrst and were subse-
quently followed by the patterns of phobic avoidance, general anxiety, and depressed
mood. The patients, he claimed, did not realize the difference between the two kinds
50 Klein and Healy, “Donald Klein” (cit. n. 31), 331.
51 Klein, “Anxiety Reconceptualized” (cit. n. 6), 239.
52 For a classic psychoanalytic account of anxiety advocated at that moment, see Leo Rangell, “On
the Psychoanalytic Theory of Anxiety: A Statement of a Unitary Theory,” J. Amer. Psychoanal.
Assoc. 3 (1955): 389–414.
53 Klein, “Anxiety Reconceptualized” (cit. n. 6), 239.
54 Ibid., 240–1. Notably, DSM-III carried a speciﬁc emphasis on helplessness in the description for
Panic Disorder (300.01): “A common complication of this disorder is the development of an antici-
patory fear of helplessness or loss of control during a panic attack, so that the individual becomes re-
luctant to be alone or in public places away from home” (American Psychiatric Association, Diagnos-
tic and Statistical Manual [cit. n. 4], 230).
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of anxiety because the chronic anxiety submerged the particularity of the panic at-
tacks. (The originary patient’s claim, then, that he was no longer running to the nurses
because he realized they could do nothing for him, was, on Klein’s account, an erro-
neous post hoc explanation.) Chronic anxiety remained, Klein explained, because al-
though imipramine brought patients’ panic under control, the patients did not know
or believe that this would remain the case. Thus their anticipatory anxiety remained
and kept in place their avoidant mechanisms (the phobic limitations). Klein’s formu-
lations would, in time, assist in establishing panic as a central topic for research and
treatment. Klein came to understand panic as a kind of “spontaneous” attack result-
ing from a dysfunctional somatic mechanism; he argued that imipramine normalized
this dysfunctionality.55 This, I argue, helped to transform the locus of clinical inter-
vention in cases of panic: consideration of the situations or places in which paroxys-
mal anxiety had occurred was of secondary interest since the primary question was
how to cure the defective somatic mechanism—which produced the panic—pharma-
cologically.56
Klein’s formulations—ﬁrst developed in his articles from the 1960s, though con-
tinuing to this day57—turned upside down established psychiatric wisdom concerning
the development of paroxysmal anxiety out of chronic anxiety (a formulation that had
loosely followed Freud’s understanding of anxiety neurosis).58 They also shifted the
mise-en-scène of agoraphobia that had been in place since Westphal’s ﬁrst inquiries
into agoraphobia in the 1870s. The scene of Klein’s pharmacological dissections—
the hospital ward and a panic-stricken inpatient running to his nurses—moved the
spatial imaginary of the disorder away from the streets and squares that had until then
formed the primary stage for agoraphobic behavior. That Klein’s originary panic dis-
order patient was male rather than female also marked a break with many psychiatric
and psychoanalytic commonplaces concerning women and agoraphobia.59 Klein’s
model replaced the backdrop of public space with the drama of a terriﬁed ﬁgure run-
ning to be comforted in the closeted space of a hospital ward: at the center of the dis-
55 See, e.g., Donald F. Klein et al., Diagnosis and Drug Treatment of Psychiatric Disorders: Adults
and Children (Baltimore, 1980).
56 Klein, “Anxiety Reconceptualized” (cit. n. 6), 239. Klein, in the latter part of the 1960s, but-
tressed his own results by citing F. N. Pitts and J. N. McClure, “Lactate Metabolism in Anxiety Neu-
rosis,” New Engl. J. Med. 277 (1967): 1329–36. Pitts and McClure had run a study showing that in-
travenous lactate infusions bring on a panic attack in those people who suffer from spontaneous panic
attacks but rarely have any effect on normal individuals. For Klein, the lactate-induced panic seemed
to mirror, and provide grounded conﬁrmation of, his model of the spontaneous panic attack. Orr has
argued that Klein’s “panic-disordered body is deﬁned by an absence of relation to any social reason
for the force or the timing of its terror. Even within its classiﬁcatory family of ‘anxiety disorders,’
panic disorder stands out as the psychic response to no discernible stimulus” (Orr, Panic Diaries
[cit. n. 13], 174; emphasis in the original).
57 Klein remains a proliﬁc scientiﬁc author. In more recent years, he has championed “serendipity”
in psychopharmacology, which he sees as central to the psychopharmcological successes of the 1950s
and 1960s, and which he believes to have been wrongly pushed to the side by the logic of rational drug
development. See, e.g., Donald F. Klein, “The Loss of Serendipity in Psychopharmacology,” J. Amer.
Med. Assoc. 299 (2008): 1063–5.
58 Sigmund Freud, “On the Grounds for Detaching a Particular Syndrome from Neurasthenia under
the Description ‘Anxiety Neurosis,’” in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works
of Sigmund Freud (1893–1899), vol. 3, ed. James Strachey (London, 1895), 85–115.
59 Many post–World War II approaches to agoraphobia associated it with particular kinds of fem-
ininity; see, e.g., D. Buglass et al., “A Study of Agoraphobic Housewives,” Psychol. Med. 7 (1977):
73–86.
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order lay not a problem in negotiating public spaces of exchange and sociality but a
problem of dependency and need for a substitute mother ﬁgure. The tumult of the city
receded; a small-scale, intimate parent-child drama took its place.
* * *
In the remainder of this article I want to consider in greater detail the practices of
clinical observation—as well as what I shall call their “intimate geographies”—that
accompanied those early, creative experiments by Klein and Fink at Hillside Hospi-
tal. These are, I believe, central to understanding how those experiments helped focus
attention on a psychopathological manifestation of affect that would, in time, allow
the inauguration of the new nosological category of panic disorder. My interest lies in
understanding how Klein and Fink responded to the challenges posed in the 1956
conference on the evaluation of pharmacotherapy, and how their experiments mobi-
lized particular formulations of psychopathological affect. The originary scene that
Klein described under a rubric of “pure empiricism” drew together a complex net-
work of material objects (e.g., the drug imipramine), socio-spatial settings (spaces
of psychotherapeutic consultation vs. the regular space of the ward), discursive ele-
ments (the speech of patients, therapists, ward staff), bodily movements (patients
running, or not running, to their nurses), and changes in affective rhythms and de-
meanors (e.g., increases in patients’ “aggressive self-assertion” upon taking imipra-
mine). For psychopathological anxiety to be transformed from one into two ontolog-
ically distinct kinds, which elements within this network were prioritized and valorized,
and which, ultimately, were ignored? The 1956 conference had set out multiple ways
of traversing and mapping a dense and heterogeneous landscape so as to determine
whether, how, and with what consequences drugs might “act.” But how widely did
Klein and Fink’s map extend? How did it end up validating some elements within
that landscape and occluding others? And is the concept of “purity” (namely, Klein’s
claim of “pure empiricism”) apposite in characterizing that scientiﬁc and clinical scene?
OBSERVING BEHAVIOR
Central to Klein and Fink’s framework for adjudicating drug action was their notion
of a “behavioral reaction pattern.”60 How did they conceptualize behavior, and what
role did affect play? Notably, changes in affect were one of the ﬁve criteria—along-
side changes in symptoms, patterns of communication, and participation in psycho-
therapy and social activity—they used to divide patients into groups.61 But what was
meant by affect? The researchers set great store on “gain[ing] a broad image of the
patient’s behavior”: not only did they shy away from the enumeration of “simple lists
of traits and symptoms,” but they also deemed batteries of psychological, psychiatric,
and behavioral indices to be of little use in assisting in the carving out of relevant
patient subpopulations.62 Of the eight behavior change clusters that Klein and Fink
60 Klein and Fink’s collaborative work followed earlier work by Fink in which he had examined
behavioral patterns to explore the effects of convulsive therapy. See Max Fink, “A Uniﬁed Theory
of the Action of Physiodynamic Therapies,” J. Hillside Hospital 6 (1957): 197–206; Fink, R. L. Kahn,
and M. A. Green, “Psychological Factors Affecting Individual Differences in Behavioral Response to
Convulsive Therapy,” J. Nerv. Mental Disease 128 (1959): 243–8. Fink would go on to become one
of the world’s leading electroconvulsive therapy researchers.
61 Klein and Fink, “Behavioral Reaction Patterns” (cit. n. 31), 449, 457.
62 Ibid.; emphasis added.
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enumerated, several centered on affect (e.g., “reduction of anger,” “affective stabil-
ity,” and “unaffected episodic anxiety”). Affect, then, was embedded within and
helped to constitute the “broad image” of behavior—and was addressed via patient
demeanor, gestures, actions, and expressions. It appeared in a variety of forms and
was underwritten by different kinds of evidence that was gathered via different kinds
of observations by different kinds of people. Those patients placed by Klein and Fink
in the reaction pattern group “Suppressive Denial,” for example, were distinguished
by “a fearful suspiciousness accompanied by derogatory ideas of reference.” Claims
that they are “fearful, agitated, and panicky” were grounded in references to their
speech being “evasive” or “guarded,” and their social interactions being “hostile,
fearfully demanding, and leading to mutual withdrawal.” Crucially, one source of ob-
servational evidence was the affective reactions in those staff interacting with them:
these patients were described as “engender[ing] uncomfortable feelings in staff per-
sonnel, with fears of assaultive behavior.”63 In comparison, the “somatizing” group
was characterized not only by patients’ “chronic use of bodily complaints” but by
“manipulation as a basis for interpersonal relatedness.” Manipulation was evidenced
by a fascinating range of affectively tinged behaviors that were interpreted through a
contrast between patients’ outward expression and their “inner states.” Before treat-
ment with phenothiazines, for example, somatizing patients were deemed to be
friendly during those interactions where they felt that they were about to get their way,
and depressed, fearful, reproachful, sulky, and covertly angry when their demands were
denied. Their symptoms and affective upheavals were most prominent in relation to the
medical staff, appearing to be role-playing devices rather than expressions of inner
states.64
After treatment with phenothiazines, these patients responded with “heightened ma-
nipulation”: the evidence that Klein and Fink marshaled here included “histrionic
demonstrations of physical distress such as slumping slowly to the ﬂoor, wearing a
wet towel around the head, walking around the corridors leaning against or touching
the wall or using both hands on the stair bannister,” and the abandoning of hospital
activities “as another gesture of helpless distress.” Klein and Fink concluded that
these patients’ somatic and affective complaints seemed “best understood as manip-
ulative communications rather than the direct expression of anxiety or depression”;
they claimed, furthermore, that “secondary gain is marked, and their illness is utilized
in an attempt to maintain a protected dependent status.”65
What is noticeable in these descriptions is the range of different frameworks used
to characterize and interpret both patients’ actions and their displays of affect. De-
scriptions of affect frequently embedded affect within an account of social interaction
(either between patients or between a patient and a member of clinical staff) or a ver-
bal exchange (between a patient and his/her psychotherapist or with a member of
ward staff ). Not infrequently, evidence was given that was not necessarily about af-
fect witnessed in the patient, but that comprised feelings invoked by the patient in the
attending clinical staff. (Clinical staff might have been turning, here, to psychoana-
63 Ibid., 451.
64 Ibid., 454.
65 Ibid.
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lytic principles concerning countertransference, or to other models in which personal
feeling was relied upon to assist with diagnosis—such as those indebted to Rümke’s
“Praecox Gefühl,” which was used to identify schizophrenia.)66 Sometimes there was
the implication that interpretations were being made of patients’ bodily and/or facial
demeanor, or of the affective timbre of their speech (e.g., “patients now approached
the interviewer in an ingratiating manner,” or patients “expressed boredom with hos-
pital routine”).67 Sometimes, an affectively tinged descriptor—a patient appearing
“fearful” or “helpless”—was associated with (inauthentic) “role-play” that ran counter
to the inner state, and at other times it was invoked as an apparent endorsement of
the patient’s authentic affective state. Affective displays were often linked to partic-
ular kinds of encounters in particular socio-spatial contexts (e.g., differences were
noted between how the patient might behave in the context of a psychotherapeutic
encounter, in comparison with social interactions on the wards). This array of frame-
works and modes of gathering evidence makes us aware of how heterogeneous the
practices of observing, assessing, and interpreting patient behavior and affect appear
to have been within the psychiatric hospital at that moment.68 Eric J. Engstrom, in his
analysis of Kraepelin’s late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century interest in the role
of emotions in psychiatric illness, emphasizes Kraepelin’s desire—as manifested in
his diagnostic cards [Zählkarten]—to develop “reliable diagnostic techniques that,
in turn, would lead the way toward greater prognostic certainty in day-to-day clinical
practice.”69 How to identify and document details regarding a patient’s behavior,
emotions, and cognitive abilities—and how to relate these to a diagnosis—remained
a challenge for psychiatry through the course of the twentieth century. Nosological
schemas and modes of identifying and classifying symptoms, behaviors, and affects
remained labile and heterogeneous. Indeed, the fact that there was no uniformly ac-
cepted method through which to evaluate the patient—and the effect of the drugs on
him or her—was one strong impetus behind the 1956 conference on “The Evaluation
of Pharmacotherapy in Mental Illness” discussed earlier.
We see how Klein’s and Fink’s published texts intermingle psychoanalytic princi-
ples and techniques (e.g., the concept of “secondary gain”), both so-called folk and
scientiﬁc descriptors of affect, and various clinical frameworks used to describe phe-
nomenology, symptomatology, and psychopathology (e.g., the concept of “ideas of
reference”). They always inserted affect into a broader hermeneutic matrix through
which to assess changes in the patient as a whole. Klein and Fink critiqued the use
of “target symptoms” in relation to psychopharmacological research—arguing that
such a model, by erroneously assuming that each manifestation of affect (in the con-
text of a psychopathological symptom) was “identical in nature from patient to pa-
66 H. C. Rümke, “Das Kernsymptom der Schizophrenie und das ‘Praecox Gefühl,’” Zentralbl.
Gesam. Neurol. Psychiat. 102 (1942): 168–9.
67 Klein and Fink, “Behavioral Reaction Patterns” (cit. n. 31), 451.
68 For additional insights into how Klein is likely to have been assessing patient behavior (including
affective behavior), see Loring L. Burnett and Donald F. Klein, “A Guide for the Psychiatric Case
Study,” J. Hillside Hospital 14 (1965): 54–68. In this guide, “Affect” (which was considered under
the heading “Direct Observations”) included such diverse subheadings as “Tension: level, ﬂuctuation,
startle reactions”; “Anxiety: ﬁdgeting, blushing, wet palms”; “Mood: apathy, expansiveness, depres-
sion, exhilaration, ﬂuctuation”; “Expressiveness: inhibited, spontaneous, impulsive”; and “Genuine-
ness vs. simulation: exaggerated, feigned.”
69 Eric J. Engstrom, “Tempering Madness: Emil Kraepelin’s Research on Affective Disorders,” in
this volume.
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tient,”70 ended up “implicitly promot[ing] a mosaic view of psychopathology.” They
went to some lengths to convey how any particular affect might be exacerbated or
attenuated in very different ways according to the distinctive behavioral typology
in which it appeared. (For example, phenothiazine treatment had, they argued, very
different effects on behaviors understood as “anxiety,” depending on the overall be-
havioral reaction group of which anxiety was one part: in the “somatizing” group,
anxiety after phenothiazine treatment became “markedly accentuated with much dra-
matic expressiveness, when dealing with psychiatric staff but it was not apparent dur-
ing the patient’s social intercourse,” whereas “anxiety” in the “episodic anxiety” was
entirely unchanged.)71 They concluded that “each symptom represents a prominent
facet of various complex adaptations . . . which can be most fruitfully described in
a patterned multivariate context.”72
What allowed the identiﬁcation of those temporally and spatially patterned ac-
counts of changes in patients’ affective demeanors, gestures, and expressions was,
Klein and Fink made clear, long-term, “expert observation” by psychiatric research-
ers who knew the patients. They disparaged the approach taken in many large hos-
pital programs, where many patients were examined and tested by several raters who
were not able to have prolonged clinical contact with patients, arguing that “the expe-
rienced clinician is our most sensitive cluster analytic device, given the opportunity to
use his skills.” (“Cluster analysis” emerged in the 1950s, and clustering algorithms be-
gan to be used in psychiatry in an attempt to cluster different groups of patients accord-
ing to symptomatology. That Klein and Fink believed the individual, highly trained ob-
server to trump the technological potency of clustering algorithms emphasized how
sophisticated they believed that observer’s techniques of parsing, amalgamating, and
discerning to be.)73 In contrast to the contemporaneous use of rating scales, such as
Max Hamilton’s “Assessment of Anxiety States,” which was published in 1959, Klein
and Fink’s approach constituted the patient’s body as a distinct and complex entity that
existed in relation to other bodies in particular social settings: it was not something that
could be dismantled and disaggregated into a tessellation of target symptoms.74
But not all “expert observation” was regarded with equal esteem by Klein and
Fink. The observers and practices documented in their early publications made up
a collectivity—including Klein and Fink themselves, the ward staff, the psychoana-
lytic psychotherapists and their supervisors, the nursing aides, and the patients—in
which certain kinds of observation were privileged over others. The impact of this
privileging became clear when Klein and Fink’s favored approach and another mode
of observation yielded different judgments about a patient. For example, Klein and
Fink, in critiquing the reliance in many psychopharmacological evaluations on sim-
70 Klein and Fink, “Behavioral Reaction Patterns” (cit. n. 31), 457.
71 Ibid., 458.
72 Ibid.
73 Fionn Murtagh, “The History of Cluster Analysis,” in Visualization and Verbalization of Data,
ed. Jörg Blasius and Michael Greenacre (Boca Raton, Fla., 2014). See also Harvey A. Skinner and
Roger K. Blashﬁeld, “Increasing the Impact of Cluster Analysis Research: The Case of Psychiatric
Classiﬁcation,” J. Consult. Clin. Psychol. 50 (1982): 727–35.
74 Hamilton, “Assessment”; Worboys, “Hamilton Rating Scale” (both cit. n. 21). For a summary of
the use of scales and checklists in the 1950s, see Richard L. Jenkins and Maurice Lorr, “Symptom
Scales and Check Lists for Determining Symptomatic Improvement in Psychotic Patients,” in Cole
and Gerard, Psychopharmacology (cit. n. 18), 469–77.
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plistic psychotherapeutic notions of “cured” or “improved,” argued for a means by
which the “rich complexity of behavioral change” might be registered. Such com-
plexity would not, they implied, be recognized by psychotherapists, who might rate
behavior change negatively because it interfered with the progress of psychotherapy,
or by ward staff (who might rate the change as “positive” because they perceived the
nursing burden to be alleviated).75 Their research also downplayed the robustness of
much of the evidence gleaned via linguistic utterances (remember Klein’s account of
the originary patient—in which the therapist discerned no difference in therapy after
the ingestion of imipramine, and the patient himself was interpreted as providing er-
roneous explanations for his own actions). Theodore Porter’s historical research on
different forms of scientiﬁc objectivity is helpful here in allowing us to discern the
professional and disciplinary jostling over when and how individual expertise ought
to be trusted over forms of “mechanical objectivity” (such as scales or checklists).
Klein and Fink are implicitly defending one kind of clinical observation as far more
epistemologically robust than another kind of clinical observation (poor expertise in
the form of psychoanalytic techniques of observation), and also more robust than the
use of symptom checklists (a poor example of mechanical objectivity).76
Klein and Fink attempted to position observations of behavioral changes as a way
of sidestepping some of the difﬁculties attendant upon observing and adjudicating
changes in patients. But behavior was not as pellucid a means of capturing the poten-
tial effects of drug action as Klein and Fink might have wished it to have been. As we
have already seen, the means by which they brought attention to particular kinds of
behaviors rather than others was inﬂected by their interpretations of how behavior
emerged in the context of particular kinds of communicative actions. Klein and Fink
appeared to interpret some behaviors as not possessing ambivalent psychic overlays
(e.g., the “helplessness” of the patients who ran to the nurses when beset by panic
attacks), whereas other behaviors were associated with complex psychic motivations
(the “dependent façade” of the somaticizing group, who engaged in “role-playing”
with the nurses, and whose “helpless distress” was seen as a manipulative “gesture”).
In short, Klein and Fink worked with a complex hermeneutics that ended up pulling
particular affects and behaviors into analytical visibility and left others, no doubt, in
the shadows. This is perhaps particularly striking in relation to the prowess of that
“keen clinical observer”77—who was judged to have spotted the core of what was
happening in relation to the “helpless” originary patient. For while there were surely
multiple behavioral transformations that might have been noted after treatment with
imipramine, what actually was foregrounded and endowed with the greatest signiﬁ-
cance was the fact that the patient was deemed to have stopped running to the nurses
several times a day. It was the cessation of a particular kind of locomotor behavior—
over and above the timbre and speciﬁcs of the affect of anxiety—that was privileged
in Klein and Fink’s account. Paroxysmal anxiety became newly visible as a distinct
kind of psychopathological affect by dint of the removal (after imipramine treatment)
of a particular kind of socially communicative locomotor behavior.
75 Klein and Fink, “Behavioral Reaction Patterns” (cit. n. 31), 457.
76 Theodore M. Porter, Trust in Numbers: The Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and Public Life
(Princeton, N.J., 1995).
77 Klein, “Anxiety Reconceptualized” (cit. n. 6), 238.
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What were Klein and Fink actually seeing? What did they privilege in this scenario
of “pure empiricism”? While they stressed the importance of attending to behavior,
their enumeration of particular bodily actions was buttressed by a theoretical frame-
work that underpinned their descriptive typology. After all, the patient’s running was
not documented simply as locomotor action but speciﬁcally as a manifestation of
helplessness and “fearful clinging.” And it was here that the concept of “separation
anxiety,” as formulated by the psychoanalyst and ethologist John Bowlby, haunted
the empirical scene unfolding in Hillside Hospital.78 Bowlby, dissatisﬁed with the ac-
counts that Freud and later psychoanalysts had provided to explain the relationship
between the child and mother, turned to ethology in order to frame attachment as
serving a biological, prosurvival function of protection. For Bowlby, anxiety was
“a primary response not reducible to other terms and due simply to the rupture of
the attachment to [the] mother.”79 Klein, borrowing from Bowlby,80 decided that early
separation anxiety might be a particular kind of evolutionary process. Furthermore, in
his seminal paper on separation anxiety, Bowlby had described conditions of isola-
tion for the baby as activating both “crying” and “clinging” in relation to the mother
ﬁgure: “until he is in close proximity to his familiar mother-ﬁgure these instinctual
response systems do not cease motivating him,” such that until this outcome is reached
“his subjective experience is that of primary anxiety.”81 We can see here how Bowlby,
in shifting the weight of interpretation away from agoraphobic anxiety concerning
streets and squares, assisted in establishing a model of phobic anxiety in which attach-
ment ﬁgures (particularly the mother) were equated with the environment of the
home.82 Klein and Fink superimposed Bowlby’s small-scale dyadic scene featuring
a crying, clinging child and a reassuring mother onto the ﬁgures of an adult male pa-
tient and a nurse within the space of the Hillside Hospital psychiatric ward.
78 It is of course impossible to know from the published documentation whether Klein and Fink
were already on the lookout for manifestations of “separation anxiety” as the early experiments began,
or whether their theorizations took place subsequent to the “keen clinical observer” noticing the ces-
sation of the running to the nurses’ station. Klein and Fink’s ﬁrst paper on imipramine certainly re-
ferred to Bowlby’s “separation anxiety,” noting that for Bowlby, “separation anxiety has the biolog-
ical function of evoking the retrieving and mothering response in a parent. . . . One may speculate that
imipramine, in these patients, has some speciﬁc reparative effects upon this disordered emotion”
(Klein and Fink, “Psychiatric Reaction Patterns” [cit. n. 29], 436).
79 John Bowlby, “Separation Anxiety,” Int. J. Psychoanal. 41 (1960): 89–113, on 93.
80 Klein retrospectively described his turn to the work of Bowlby as follows: he had noticed that
many of his agoraphobic patients manifested dependent behavior, and that many had been clinging
children, fearful of going to school. Subsequently, he and his colleague Rachel Gittelman-Klein con-
ducted a double-blind, placebo-controlled study of “school phobic” children whose central problem
was deemed to be separation anxiety; the results indicated that imipramine was very successful in
helping with school phobia. The same drug that apparently blocked panic attacks in adults seemed
also to diminish separation anxiety in children. Klein, therefore, again working backward from drug
responses, began to consider whether “in some sense, an outbreak of separation anxiety was at the root
of agoraphobia” (Klein, “Anxiety Reconceptualized” [cit. n. 6], 245). See Rachel Gittelman-Klein and
Donald Klein, “Controlled Imipramine Treatment of School Phobia,” Arch. Gen. Psychiat. 25 (1971):
204–7; Gittelman-Klein and Klein, “School Phobia: Diagnostic Considerations in the Light of Imip-
ramine Effects,” J. Nerv. Mental Disease 156 (1973): 199–215.
81 Bowlby, “Separation Anxiety” (cit. n. 79), 93.
82 Bowlby’s model of separation anxiety served several purposes for Klein. It manifested the same
kind of distaste for “baroque structures” of symbolic interpretation as Klein’s theory of panic. For
Bowlby, separation anxiety functioned as a kind of unmediated protest mechanism whose form
was very similar to Klein’s understanding of panic as an autonomic discharge of paroxysmal anxiety.
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CONCLUSION
Klein and Fink’s early psychopharmacological experiments involved a small number
of patients and a small number of “expert” clinical observers who inhabited a small
psychiatric hospital away from the heft of mainstream large university research cen-
ters. In time, those experiments would come to have an impact that was both geo-
graphically and conceptually extensive, for Klein’s work on pharmacological dissec-
tion in Hillside Hospital acted as the germinator for a diagnosis, panic disorder, that is
now ﬁrmly embedded in multiple countries and across many psychiatric cultures.83
Klein and Fink privileged particular observational practices as they traced a route
through a hermeneutically dense terrain composed of heterogeneous patients, hetero-
geneous drugs, and all manner of “noise” vis-à-vis the behavioral features, linguistic
utterances, and affective transformations that might, potentially, be of use in assess-
ing whether and how imipramine acted. Those practices brought a particular manifes-
tation of psychopathological anxiety to center stage. At a historical moment in which
the clinical-evaluative drive was toward working with larger numbers of patients,
larger research sites, and the use of target symptoms and the development of complex
rating scales, Klein and Fink’s experiments were characterized by their “intimate ge-
ographies.”
Those geographies were centered on one research site and entailed the direct ob-
servation of patients’ bodies—as entire, communicative, and spatially and temporally
patterned entities—within the ward by clinical researchers and ward staff who knew
those patients well. The intimacy of those geographies was perhaps dramatized most
poignantly by the coming to life of Bowlby’s separation-anxiety-disordered infant (in
need of her mother) in the body of the “episodic anxiety”-disordered male adult pa-
tient (in need of the reassurance of the nurse). Whereas Westphal’s case histories had
referenced Berlin squares that piqued agoraphobics’ fear, Klein’s narrative of his
originary patient was one that displaced the city and replaced it with the drama of
a child-and-parent dyad. The agoraphobia of Westphal’s patients was exempliﬁed
by their stuttering, stalled passage through the public sphere; the panic disorder of
Klein’s originary patient was exempliﬁed by a frenzied running to the nurse/mother.
Klein and Fink mobilized a complex and creative experimental apparatus compris-
ing heterogeneous bodies and heterogeneous drugs moving within a particular socio-
spatial setting. They rendered visible and validated particular interpretations of affec-
tive behavior in their consolidation of distinct behavioral reaction patterns—which,
in turn, led to Klein’s powerful elaboration of the logics of psychopharmacological
dissection. David Healy has argued that for Klein and Fink,
the new drugs were an experiment that would lead to new observations. The trick was to
remain open-minded enough to see phenomena that available theories did not predict.
New theories to explain these observations could be elaborated later. This was almost
83 Admittedly, this was a long process. Many psychiatrists profoundly disagreed with Klein’s inter-
pretation of the imipramine ﬁndings. Some argued that he had mistaken his patients’ symptoms and
that the patients were actually suffering from depression; others (e.g., the behaviorist Isaac Marks who
was based at the Maudsley Hospital in the United Kingdom) argued that Klein’s panic disorder pa-
tients should instead be diagnosed as agoraphobic and saw no basis for Klein’s new nosological cat-
egory.
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a new form of science, one that acknowledged that techniques drive progress as much as,
if not more than, anything else.84
But Klein himself has not claimed, in fact, to have made any actual new observations.
(He has emphasized that Freud had, in fact, described panic attacks “beautifully” in
1895 but argued that Freud’s “theory prevented his observations.”)85 “So, it’s not like
it’s a new observation,” stated Klein: “What’s new is that I put it together a different
way.”86 What was new was a complex socio-spatial assemblage that Fink and Klein
put together and set into motion. We need, I argue, to attend to the spatial as well as
temporal speciﬁcs of this assemblage in order to discern how this new form of psy-
chopathological affect—which would come to be termed panic disorder—emerged
and then gained epistemological and ontological consistency. Through Klein and
Fink’s experiments, one drug (imipramine) operated in combination with one “good
clinical observer”—to which was added the compelling overlay of Bowlby’s ﬁgure
of mother and child. Such were the elements that brought to center stage one small,
affectively dramatic scene. Klein’s analysis of the patient running to the nurse al-
lowed him to “singl[e] out panic attack as being the key variable that was changing
with imipramine”87 and led, in time, to the consolidation of a new nosology of anx-
iety.
84 Healy, Creation (cit. n. 16), 282.
85 Klein, “Anxiety Reconceptualized” (cit. n. 6), 245; Klein, interview by Callard (cit. n. 46).
86 Klein, “Anxiety Reconceptualized” (cit. n. 6), 245.
87 Klein and Healy, “Donald Klein” (cit. n. 31), 331.
226 FELICITY CALLARD
